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SEGÚN RAWLS: UNA DEFENSA  
Resumen: Mi objetivo en este artículo es aclarar y defender uno de los as-
pectos más relevantes de la argumentación de Rawls sobre la justicia inter-
nacional, a saber, su doctrina sobre los Derechos Humanos. En primer 
lugar me ocuparé de la reconstrucción de su teoría sobre los Derechos 
Humanos; luego desarrollaré dos argumentos que permiten asumirla co-
mo correcta. El primer argumento se refiere al razonamiento de los agen-
tes que representan a los pueblos democráticos liberales, cuya posición 
original es adecuada a la identificación de los principios de la justicia in-
ternacional desde su punto de vista común. El segundo argumento se refie-
re a la importancia de la historia y la cultura con respecto a la identifica-
ción de los intereses fundamentales de los individuos; en mi interpretación, 
finalmente, sostengo con Rawls que ambos argumentos pueden ser abor-
dados dentro de una teoría de la justicia más general que antepone a los 
derechos internacionales el argumento que privilegia los derechos intrín-
secos como el respeto moral a la persona humana. 
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RAWLS ON PEOPLES, PERSONS AND  
HUMAN RIGHTS: A DEFENSE 
Abstract: My aim in this paper is to clarify and defend just one aspect of 
Rawls’s theory of international justice, namely his doctrine of human 
rights. Of course, what I shall say will bear on other aspects of his theory 
as well, but my focus is Rawls’s position on human rights. I begin by re-
constructing and thereby, I hope, clarifying that position. I then develop 
two arguments for thinking it correct. The first concerns the reasoning of 
agents representing liberal democratic peoples in an original position ap-
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propriate to the identification of principles of international justice from 
their common point of view. The second concerns the importance of his-
tory and culture with respect to identifying the fundamental interests of 
individual human persons. Finally, I suggest that these two arguments 
show the consistence of Rawls’s proposal, which is, in my opinion, less 
vulnerable to objection than many of his critics have claimed.  
 
Key words: International justice, law of peoples, liberal democracy. 
 
In The Law of Peoples (hereafter LP), John Rawls turns 
his attention to the question of international justice.1 His 
analysis in LP has not been well–received.2 To these com-
plaints I would add a fifth, which I shall only mention. And 
that is that the only aspect of corrective justice Rawls dis-
cusses as part of non–ideal theory is just war theory, which 
                                                 
1 Rawls, J., The Law of Peoples, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1999. 
This is an extended and revised version of Rawls’s Oxford Amnesty Lecture ti-
tled “The Law of Peoples” and published in On Human Rights, Shute, S. and 
Hurley, H., eds., Basic Books, 1993. 
2 The complaints are roughly fourfold. The first is that while many of the po-
litically moderate substantive proposals made in LP are, not surprisingly, 
quite plausible, there is little in LP by way of careful, detailed argument for 
them. Rawls’s view is, the complaint goes, opaque and underdeveloped. The 
second concerns Rawls’s doctrine of human rights. The charge is that Rawls’s 
doctrine is too thin or anemic and that it ought to be replaced by a more 
robustly liberal and democratic conception of human rights. The third is that 
Rawls fails to require democracy of international institutions, whether global 
institutions such as the United Nations or World Trade Organization, or re-
gional institutions such as the Organization of African States or European 
Union. The final complaint is that Rawls not only fails to defend but positively 
rejects any principle of global economic justice constraining the growth of 
inequalities between peoples. The demands of global economic justice are 
met, on Rawls’s view, so long as all peoples enjoy the minimum level of eco-
nomic development necessary to constitute and maintain themselves as a 
peoples and to engage in free and fair trade with other peoples. The wealthy 
peoples of the so–called “first world” are obligated as a matter of interna-
tional justice to take only those steps needed to secure these conditions. See, 
e.g., Charles Beitz, “Rawls’s Law of Peoples,” Ethics, v. 110(4), 2000, pp. 
669–696, and “Human Rights as Common Concerns,” American Political 
Science Review, v. 95(2), 2001, pp. 269–282; Buchanan, A., “Rawls’s Law of 
Peoples: Rules for a Vanishing Westphalian World,” Ethics, v. 110(4), 2000, 
pp. 697–721; Pogge, T., “An Egalitarian Law of Peoples,” Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, v. 23(3), 1994, pp. 195–224, and “The International Signifi-
cance of Human Rights, ”Journal of Ethics”, v. 4(1), 2000, pp. 45–69; and 
Tan, K.–Ch., Toleration, Diversity and Global Justice, Penn State University 
Press, 2000, esp. ch. 4. 




applies only to present, ongoing injustices. Yet, we know that 
uncorrected historical injustices are one of the most vexing 
problems of contemporary international relations.  
Accordingly, they need to be theorized as part of any com-
plete and adequate theory of international justice.  
My aim in this paper is to clarify and defend just one as-
pect of Rawls’s theory of international justice, namely his 
doctrine of human rights. Of course, what I shall say will 
bear on other aspects of his theory as well, but my focus is 
Rawls’s position on human rights. I begin by reconstructing 
and thereby, I hope, clarifying that position. I then develop 
two arguments for thinking it correct. The first concerns the 
reasoning of agents representing liberal democratic peoples 
in an original position appropriate to the identification of 
principles of international justice from their common point of 
view. The second concerns the importance of history and 
culture with respect to identifying the fundamental interests 
of individual human persons. 
Peoples, Persons, International Justice and Human Rights in LP. 
The problem of international justice is, for Rawls, a prob-
lem concerning the relations between “peoples”, not states 
simpliciter. To speak of peoples is to speak of the artificial 
corporate moral agents, or persons, that make  
conflicting claims upon one another on the global stage. Of 
course, peoples are not the only agents capable of making 
claims on the global stage. States may, for example, make 
such claims. But a theory of international justice concerns the 
conflicting claims made by moral agents, not agents simplic-
iter. And states qua states are not moral agents, but rather 
agents simpliciter. Still, peoples are not the only moral agents 
capable of making claims on the global stage, claims the right 
resolution of which is a matter of justice. Individual human 
persons, for example, as well as other artificial corporate 
agents possessed of the requisite moral nature, may also make 
claims. But the problem of international justice concerns first 
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and foremost the relations between peoples.3 
Rawls emphasizes three features shared by all peoples. 
First, they possess a degree of cultural unity (even if, as in 
pluralist liberal democracies, only in their public political 
culture) sufficient to underwrite a set of identifiable and de-
terminate ends. Second, they possess an institutional em-
bodiment sufficient to enable them to advance their ends in 
the world. Third, they possess a capacity for self–regulation 
in the interests of justice as they pursue their ends in the 
world.4 Taken together, these features justify the claim that 
peoples possess to the requisite minimum degree the two 
fundamental moral powers essential to personhood.5 
But these are not the only conditions that must be satis-
fied by all peoples. Rawls insists also that peoples are also 
well–ordered, genuine, self–sufficient or independent 
schemes of social cooperation among individual human per-
sons.6 This point merits further elaboration.  
Peoples are in principle self–sufficient or independent in 
a way that individual human persons are not. Individual 
human persons literally come to be as persons only within 
and through social cooperation. They must cooperate with 
others to satisfy their most fundamental interests, including 
their interest in securing the social conditions necessary to 
their moral status as persons. But matters are different with 
respect to peoples. Peoples can and sometimes do both come 
to be and persist over time as peoples apart from any  
cooperation with other peoples. And while many peoples 
adopt ends unrealizable except through cooperation with 
other peoples, no people must. Any people (and therefore all 
peoples) might commit itself to securing domestic justice, for 
                                                 
3 There are several reasons for this. One is that as a matter of history, peoples 
have proved themselves to be the most significant actors on the global stage. 
Another is that peoples are ontologically or analytically prior to individual 
human persons, at least in the paradigm case.  
4 Rawls, The Laws of..., cit., pp. 23–30. 
5 On the two fundamental moral powers as essential to personhood, see A 
Theory of Justice, pp. 442–447; and Political Liberalism, pp. 48–54.  
6 Rawls, The Laws of..., cit., pp. 4, 19, 64–67. 




example, as its only fundamental end. Assuming that there is 
no significant territory on Earth within which human beings 
might not constitute and govern themselves as a people 
committed to no final end other than domestic justice, there 
is no reason in principle why peoples qua peoples must  
cooperate with one another.7  
To say that a people is well–ordered is to say that its 
members constitute and govern themselves as a single body 
politic through a conception of justice (even if illiberal and 
undemocratic) that is publicly known, publicly enforced and 
(for the most part) voluntarily honored. A well–ordered peo-
ple is stable over time without excessive or widespread coer-
cion, manipulation or deception. And it constitutes and  
governs itself through a conception (again, even if illiberal 
and nondemocratic) of justice. While different conceptions of 
justice employ different substantive principles to resolve con-
flicting claims between individual human persons, they all 
employ principles nonviolative of the moral status of claim-
ants as individual human persons. That is, they all  
recognize in one way or another the inviolability of persons 
that lies at the heart of justice. Thus, a people is always more 
than a mere system of social interaction aimed at and justified 
by reference to some aggregate or corporate good. A people is 
always a system of social cooperation aimed at and justified 
by reference to the good of its members, all of whom regard 
themselves and one another as human persons, as moral 
agents, both rational and reasonable, and thus as independ-
ent sources of valid claims on one another.  
It is, I think, safe to say that on Rawls’s view all peoples 
are constitutional republics in the most basic sense. They 
publicly constitute themselves as bodies politic aimed at the 
common good of their members taken as individual persons 
                                                 
7 Whether the assumption grounding this claim is realistic or not is, of course, 
open to debate. But Rawls’s view is that the material conditions needed for 
human beings to constitute themselves as a people are less important and 
demanding than the cultural conditions, and that the latter rarely fall outside 
the reach of human beings to secure. 
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and thus claimants on the body politic.8 But what of the 
                                                 
8 Rawls is quite careful in his use of the term “peoples.” He refers to states (as in 
“outlaw states”) rather than peoples when speaking of those  
institutionally embodied corporate agents (in control of territory) that sys-
tematically refuse to abide by principles of international justice. Lacking the 
requisite moral nature, outlaw states are not corporate persons, or peoples, 
and thus can assert no valid claims of justice against other peoples. In the 
same spirit, Rawls refers to societies (as in “burdened societies”) when  
referring to those groups of individual human beings lacking either the cul-
tural unity or institutional embodiment (including material and economic re-
sources) requisite to constitute themselves collectively as a people. Unable to 
have and advance a consistent, coherent and determinate set of ends, bur-
dened societies are not corporate persons, or peoples, and thus can assert no 
valid claims of international justice against other peoples. 
 Of course, individual human beings living in outlaw states or burdened so-
cieties may still assert valid claims of international justice. Specifically, they 
may assert their human rights, both against their own government and 
against all other peoples. Rawls’s doctrine of human rights specifies the 
claims that individuals may so assert no matter where they happen to live. So, 
individuals living in a persistently expansionist and aggressive outlaw state 
may demand, as a matter of international justice, that their human rights be 
honored during any international undertaking to constrain their state. And, 
individuals living in an outlaw state that systematically commits gross inter-
nal human rights violations may demand, as a matter of international justice, 
that steps be taken by other peoples to end such violations. Individuals living 
in burdened societies and thus without the material or cultural resources 
necessary collectively to constitute themselves as a people may insist, as a 
matter of international justice, on aid from other peoples. 
 Importantly, Rawls’s view is not that human beings living within outlaw 
states or burdened societies (and thus denied membership within a well–
ordered people) are merely, and may assert claims only as, human beings 
rather than human persons. There is no bright line the crossing of which 
marks the transition from human being to human person. Human beings liv-
ing within outlaw states or burdened societies will typically participate in 
many forms of social life and cooperation within and through which their 
moral capacity for a sense of justice will be developed and exercised. And 
human beings may always find themselves cast into an outlaw state or bur-
dened society from the happier circumstance of membership within a well–
ordered people. Rawls’s point is simply that within an outlaw state or bur-
dened society the moral capacity for a sense of justice cannot be exercised to 
the minimum degree necessary to personhood when it comes to issues of jus-
tice, and thus personhood, in the sense relevant to issues of justice, can at best 
be approximated. Here it bears emphasizing that the moral contexts within 
which the distinction between human beings and human persons will prove 
of great import are many and diverse and there is no reason to think that the 
distinction must be marked in exactly the same way in all contexts, even if the 
ways in which it is marked must be consistent with, or better cohere with, 
one another.  




normative relations between peoples and persons? This is a 
more complicated matter. Analytically, persons exist, for the 
purposes of justice, only in and through membership within 
peoples. And thus peoples are analytically prior to persons. 
Normatively, however, matters here are indeterminate. The 
normative status of a people depends on its being well–
ordered, and this requires that it publicly honor a public con-
ception of justice consistent with and minimally adequate to 
the status of all members as persons, as participants in a mu-
tually advantageous system of cooperation. So a people must 
treat its members as persons. But to do so it need honor no 
more than Rawls’s conception of human rights. Of course, as 
a people develops over time, its members may come to think 
and experience themselves as persons in a far richer and 
more demanding sense than that minimally  
necessary to the idea of a well–ordered people. And the per-
sons living within the peoples to which this happens may 
have a further normative priority over the people to which 
                                                                                                
 Rawls’s point is not that the fate of individual human persons is never a mat-
ter of international justice, the latter being concerned only with a certain class 
of corporate persons, namely peoples. Nor is it that those not belonging to a 
people are not persons at all for the purposes of any moral inquiry or judg-
ment. His point is rather that belonging to a people is ordinarily a  
necessary social condition to personhood within the context of inquiry into or 
judgment over issues of justice. And this is so because the two moral  
powers essential to personhood for the purposes of issues of justice cannot 
ordinarily be developed and exercised by individual human beings to a  
sufficient minimum degree apart from membership within a well–ordered 
body politic.  
 The priority relations between peoples and individual human persons then 
are complex. Analytically (or perhaps ontologically) peoples are prior to  
individual human persons, at least if we are theorizing justice, for individual 
human persons arise in and through membership within peoples. But ana-
lytically (or perhaps ontologically) human beings are prior to peoples, for 
peoples exist only in and through social relations between human beings. 
And normatively human beings are prior to peoples. While peoples, as artifi-
cial corporate persons, have normative status as claimants when it comes to 
justice, that status depends on their being well–ordered internally by a con-
ception of domestic justice consistent with (even if illiberal and undemo-
cratic) the moral status of all members as individual human persons. Thus, 
the claims of individual human beings to the social conditions minimally 
necessary to personhood are normatively prior to the claims of peoples. 
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they belong. But they will not enjoy that normative priority 
over all peoples, or at least they will not if we assume that 
different peoples will follow different paths of historical and 
cultural development and thus differently constitute  
individual persons as persons, so that even if there were a 
worldwide society of peoples, individual persons would not 
all have the same normative status vis a vis peoples, save for 
the baseline priority assigned to them by Rawls’s doctrine of 
human rights.  
Individual human beings are, of course, given by nature. 
Individual human persons are not. Human persons, human 
moral agents possessed to the requisite minimum degree of 
the two fundamental moral powers, are a complex social 
achievement. Essential to that achievement, on Rawls’s view, 
is genuine belonging to a people, for individual human  
beings cannot collectively and fully constitute themselves as 
human persons apart from membership within a people, a 
well–ordered body politic.9 
Persons possess a sense of justice or a capacity for and 
disposition to being reasonable and thus find themselves able 
and inclined to propose and honor fair terms of cooperation 
with others. The development and exercise of this moral ca-
pacity presupposes a social world larger and more complex 
than that given by the family and civil society, either indi-
vidually or taken together.10 It presupposes a polis or body 
                                                 
9 Of course, peoples are social achievements as well. And there are many rea-
sons why humans living together can fail to constitute themselves as a people. 
They might lack the cultural unity (including political culture)  
necessary to underwrite any system of shared ends. Or they might lack the 
material resources necessary to an adequate institutional embodiment. Or 
their institutional embodiment might fall into the hands of a tyrant or despot 
for whom the moral status of neither individual human persons nor other 
peoples (as artificial corporate persons) is of any moral concern. If every hu-
man being has a right to membership in a people (as a necessary social con-
dition to his or her self–realization as a human person), then an adequate 
conception of international justice must provide a theoretical framework  
capable of grounding a reasonable hope for a worldwide society of peoples. 
10 Both the family and civil society are, of course, necessary to the moral  
development of persons, to their acquisition of a sense of justice or capacity 
for reasonableness. But neither individually nor taken together are they  




politic within which the family and civil society are both sus-
tained and integrated in a system of nonvoluntary  
cooperation within which the claims of persons are adjusted 
to one another as required by justice.11 
It follows that if becoming or fully becoming a human 
person counts as one of the fundamental ends or interests of 
every human being, then no human being should be denied 
genuine membership within a people, a well–ordered body 
politic. Or to put it differently, every human being has a 
compelling basic claim to live as a member of a genuine peo-
ple since so living is a social condition necessary to the devel-
opment and exercise, to the requisite minimum degree, of the 
two fundamental moral powers essential to personhood. This, 
I think, is the heart of Rawls’s doctrine of human rights. Hu-
man rights are just those rights possessed by all human be-
ings by virtue of their compelling basic interest in or claim to 
genuine membership in one or another people.12 
These rights are, on Rawls’s view, subsistence and secu-
                                                                                                
sufficient. On this point, see Rawls’s account of moral development in A The-
ory of Justice, Chapter VIII. 
11 The family, like the polis, is to a large extent nonvoluntary from the point of 
view of participants. Like political society, we simply find ourselves born into 
families. But the family is unlike political society in that not all participants 
are persons. Some are merely potential persons. Civil society, like the polis, is 
an arena within which persons and only persons make conflicting claims 
upon one another. But civil society is unlike the polis in that the claims made 
by persons there all arise out of voluntary interaction. Thus, it is only in the 
polis that we confront the problem of justice: the need to adjust conflicting 
claims by persons within a scheme of interaction from which none may exit 
and thus all experience as nonvoluntary. 
12 Like Charles Jones’s or Henry Shue’s, Rawls’s doctrine of human rights is 
grounded then in the fundamental shared interests of all human beings. See, 
Shue, H., Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2nd Ed., 
Princeton Univ. Press, 1996; and Jones, Ch., Global Justice: Defending Cos-
mopolitanism, Oxford University Press, 1999. Rawls’s doctrine remains dis-
tinct, however. It is formally and publicly justified not by direct and exclusive 
reference to the fundamental shared interests of all human beings, but rather 
through two uses of an original position argument within which agents rep-
resent peoples rather than individual human beings or persons. Because it is 
so justified, it is in the most basic sense a moral constraint on the relations be-
tween peoples, rather than, as with Jones’s and Shue’s doctrine, a moral con-
straint on individuals qua individuals within a cosmopolis. 
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rity rights, certain liberty rights (freedom from slavery, serf-
dom, forced occupation, and a freedom of conscience suffi-
cient to underwrite freedom of religious practice and 
thought), the right to personal property, and the right to for-
mal justice and the rule of law. Rawls describes these rights 
as the “necessary conditions of any system of social coopera-
tion.”13 They express the minimum social conditions that 
must obtain if individual human beings are to realize them-
selves as human persons through social life with others, 
through belonging to a people. They, and only they, are hu-
man rights, properly speaking.14 Human rights are a subset 
of liberal rights, for liberal rights are those rights belonging to 
persons who conceive of themselves, politically speaking as 
free and equal, and who share a common interest in securing 
the social conditions necessary and conducive to the full de-
velopment and exercise of the two moral powers. 
On Rawls’s account, there is no human right to democ-
ratic domestic institutions. There is also no human right, 
where there are democratic domestic institutions, to univer-
sal suffrage. Religious minorities and women, for example, 
need not possess, as a matter of human rights, the right to 
vote, or an equal right to vote. Nor need they possess the 
right, or an equal right, to run for or hold public office. On 
Rawls’s view, while all human beings are entitled as a matter 
of international justice to certain basic liberties essential to 
their status as persons, they are not entitled as a matter of in-
ternational justice to the system of equal basic liberties com-
mon to liberal democratic conceptions of justice. They like-
wise are not entitled to any particular distribution of eco-
nomic resources within and through their domestic econ-
omy, other than one which secures basic subsistence and se-
curity, and is consistent with mutually advantageous coop-
                                                 
13 Rawls, The Laws of..., cit., p. 68. 
14 For a similar reading of human rights as marking the social conditions  
necessary to a minimally adequate human life, see Nickel, J., Making Sense of 
Human Rights, University of California Press, 1987, pp. 51–52.  




eration and the rule of law.15 Human rights and the demands 
of international justice more generally, then, are far less de-
manding than liberal democratic rights and the demands of 
liberal democratic justice more generally. 
Rawls’s conception of human rights falls well–short not 
only of liberal democratic principles of justice, but also of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and contemporary 
human rights discourse and practice. To be sure, there are 
important points of overlap. But the discontinuities are strik-
ing. Rawls explicitly refrains from grounding his conception 
of human rights in the UDHR’s claim that “All human beings 
are born free and equal in dignity and rights....endowed with 
reason and conscience...and [obligated] to act towards one 
another in a spirit of brotherhood.” He characterizes this 
claim as a liberal aspiration. And he rejects several UDHR 
rights as genuine human rights, e.g., the right to social secu-
rity or to equal pay for equal work, on the grounds that they 
presuppose specific kinds of institutions.16  
Notwithstanding its limited content, Rawls’s doctrine of 
human rights, if honored, would go along way toward  
alleviating some of the grossest abuses of human beings 
around the world. While it does not demand democracy, it 
does demand that individuals be able to petition their  
governments and to communicate their interests directly or 
indirectly to their leaders. And while it does not demand full 
gender equality, it does demand subsistence and security 
rights for women, as well as the right to hold and control 
personal property and to the rule of law. And while it does 
not demand liberal democratic justice, it does demand the 
priority of at least a common good conception of justice over 
other social virtues. Further, human rights are, on Rawls’s 
view, universal in the full sense of the term. They apply to all 
human beings and they bind all peoples prior to and  
                                                 
15 Of course, those who are citizens of liberal democracies have constitutional 
and civil rights to these things. Whatever the merits of liberal democracy, 
unique and exclusive fidelity to human rights is not among them on Rawls’s 
view. 
16 Rawls, The Laws of..., cit., p. 80. 
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independent of treaties or other voluntary undertakings. And 
while they may be adjusted one to another for the sake of co-
herent instantiation in diverse concrete contexts, they may 
not be sacrificed for any other reason. They thus function as 
rights, or trumps, in the familiar sense of the term. While 
critics are surely correct that in many ways Rawls’s doctrine 
falls well short of contemporary human rights discourse and 
practice, it must be noted that it is still a human rights doc-
trine with some genuine critical bite.17 
 
Yet, for those who had hoped to find in Rawls’s work 
support for the view that human rights just are liberal de-
mocratic rights, pitched at a certain high level of abstraction 
to be sure, extended and applied to all human beings regard-
less of their location or citizenship, LP has proved a disap-
pointment. I want now to develop two lines of argument 
aimed at defending the correctness of Rawls’s view. The first 
concerns Rawls’s original position argument for the princi-
ples of international justice, including the doctrine of human 
rights, he defends. The second concerns the historical and 
cultural variability of the fundamental interests of human 
persons. 
Human Rights and the Original Position Argument. 
Rawls is driven to issues of international justice by the 
need of those living within contemporary liberal democracies 
to evaluate critically the policies guiding their collective con-
duct as a people on the global stage. Since this cannot be 
done without appeal to principles of international justice, 
such principles must first be identified and justified. But, 
Rawls insists, they must be identified and justified from the 
moral point of view of the liberal democratic peoples  
                                                 
17 It should also be emphasized that Rawls nowhere suggests that liberal democ-
ratic peoples ought not work through treaty–making toward an international 
law regime more robustly liberal and democratic than his doctrine of human 
rights. Rawls’s point is simply that liberal democratic peoples cannot demand 
such treaties of other peoples on the grounds that they are required by prele-
gal and prepolitical or natural principles of international justice. 




wanting to evaluate critically their foreign policy. To identify 
and justify them in any other way would render them a 
compromise of principle. Of course, liberal democratic peo-
ples are committed to a moral principle of reciprocity in po-
litical life. In light of their own commitments, then, they must 
refrain from acting toward other peoples from principles that 
other reasonable peoples may reasonably reject.  
Toward the end of identifying and justifying such princi-
ples, Rawls deploys a two–stage original position argument. 
He first constructs an original position populated only by 
agents representing liberal democratic peoples. These agents, 
Rawls insists, would agree only to eight principles of interna-
tional justice, expressing roughly the post WW–II settlement 
in international law and including his doctrine of human 
rights.18  
Rawls then constructs a second original position popu-
lated only by agents representing illiberal and undemocratic 
but nevertheless well–ordered (and therefore reasonable) 
peoples, “decent peoples” to use Rawls’s phrase. These agents, 
he argues, would agree only to the same eight principles. 
Thus, these and only these principles constitute the first prin-
ciples of international justice.19 
Rawls’s two stage method here has two important impli-
                                                 
18 Rawls, The Laws of..., cit., p. 37. These principles limit the right of war to 
individual or collective self–defense, and they limit state sovereignty by the 
doctrine of human rights already described. They include a principle obligat-
ing all peoples to aid those societies unable to constitute themselves as a peo-
ple, and thus excluded from a just society of peoples, because “burdened by 
unfavorable conditions.” And they obligate all peoples to keep their treaties, 
honor the demands of free and fair trade, and abide by principles of just war. 
19 Again, it bears emphasizing that these principles permit the liberalization and 
democratization of international law through treaty–making or other volun-
tary undertakings. And Rawls nowhere suggests that liberal democratic peo-
ples ought not try to persuade other peoples to join them in such an  
endeavor. Rawls’s point is simply that they must persuade other peoples to  
voluntarily so join them within a context of mutual respect. Thus, the  
liberalization and democratization of the international order is a concrete his-
torical and political task that must be undertaken without the crutch of phi-
losophical claims to the effect that liberal democracy is required by principles 
of natural law or some other form of universal and transhistorical  
exercise of reason. 
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cations for his principles of international justice. First, it  
enables him to claim that they fully express the commitments 
of liberal democratic peoples with respect to matters of inter-
national justice. Second, it enables him to claim that liberal 
democratic peoples may justifiably act on them around the 
world, since no reasonable people may reasonably reject 
them. 
What puzzles many readers of LP is that Rawls thinks 
that agents representing liberal democratic peoples would 
demand no more than the modestly ambitious eight princi-
ples he identifies. After all, they represent only liberal democ-
ratic peoples. And the task they set themselves is to identify 
principles to govern the relations between liberal democratic 
peoples only. Why wouldn’t they simply agree to enforce 
general liberal democratic principles against themselves? 
What would they stand to lose by so agreeing?  
Liberal democratic peoples are, and regard themselves as, 
peoples, independent and self–sufficient artificial corporate 
moral agents.20 As peoples they, in principle, need not coop-
erate or interact with one another. They confront one another 
not as inescapably and mutually dependent participants in a 
necessary scheme of social cooperation, but rather as inde-
pendent agents prepared to cooperate on mutually acceptable 
terms but in principle capable of abstaining from cooperation 
without suffering catastrophic losses. Thus,  
liberal democratic peoples will each and all have a powerful 
reason to refuse to cooperate with one another on terms that 
undermine their independence and sovereignty.  
Of course, every liberal democratic people will agree to 
constitute itself in perpetuity as a people, for it is only by so 
doing that it enjoys the status of moral agent capable of  
asserting claims of justice on the global stage. Thus, no  
                                                 
20 Kok–Chor Tan and Charles Beitz, cited above, seem to think that Rawls’s 
reasoning here turns on the nature of peoples as communities in the strong 
sense. But this can’t be right, since liberal democratic peoples aren’t commu-
nities in the strong sense. The limited but nevertheless robust sovereignty of 
peoples, whether liberal and democratic or decent, is a function of their status 
as artificial corporate moral agents. 




liberal democratic people will reject Rawls’s doctrine of hu-
man rights as a constraint on their independence and  
sovereignty. Accepting this doctrine is a necessary condition 
to their moral status as a people.  
Further, liberal democratic peoples will insist that treaties 
be honored as a matter of international justice and that they 
thus be able voluntarily to impose on themselves a more lib-
eral and democratic regime of human rights through  
voluntary treaty–making. So much is consistent with their 
independence and sovereignty as peoples. But they will not 
agree to the imposition, as a matter of international justice, of 
such a human rights regime apart from and prior to their 
voluntarily undertaking it. In bargaining over terms of inter-
national justice, they will find none of the potential fruits to 
be gained through cooperation with other peoples of  
sufficient value to merit trading away their independence 
and sovereignty.  
Indeed, the self–respect of liberal democratic peoples de-
pends on their independence and sovereignty. Liberal de-
mocratic peoples regard their domestic instantiation of sys-
tems of liberal democratic rights as one of their own greatest 
creative achievements and thus as a basis for their own self–
respect. But to so regard their domestic orders,  
liberal democratic peoples must regard them as the products 
of self–determination. And this presupposes their  
independence and sovereignty as moral agents. It is notewor-
thy here that liberal democratic peoples take great pride in 
their realization of liberal democratic domestic orders, but 
not in their realization of basic human rights as Rawls con-
ceives them. The latter they regard as the minimal moral de-
mands they must meet to have any moral standing at all as 
peoples. Their honoring human rights is presupposed by and 
does not express their self–determination as a people. 
It is important here to remember the differences  
between Rawls’s use of the original position argument in LP 
for the purposes of identifying principles of international jus-
tice and his more familiar use of it to identify principles of 
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domestic justice. In the former use, but not the latter, the par-
ties represented are assumed to be self–sufficient, not in the 
sense that they can achieve any and all of their interests 
without cooperation, but rather in the sense that their exis-
tence as moral agents does not depend on or arise through 
cooperation. They are self–sufficient with respect to their 
most fundamental interests, securing and preserving their 
status as moral agents, and thus cooperation is strictly speak-
ing optional.21 Thus, agents representing liberal democratic 
peoples in Rawls’s first original position argument in LP need 
not regard noncooperation with other peoples as catastro-
phic. The principles of international justice, then, reflect the 
fair bargaining over terms of cooperation by agents repre-
senting parties each of whom no doubt stands to gain from 
cooperation but none of whom needs fear or avoid noncoop-
eration. Within this context, agents will find it rational, or at 
least not irrational, to bargain under the  
assumption that they represent parties blessed by the best 
possible circumstances and to veto principles that do not 
maximize the advantage of the parties they represent.22 
                                                 
21 This, it will be recalled, explains why Rawls makes no use of a list of primary 
goods to be distributed by principles of international justice. The parties to 
any agreement over principles of international justice need not cooperate 
with one another and thus do not necessarily seek from voluntary coopera-
tion any common generic goods. 
22 This helps to explain why the agents representing liberal democratic peoples 
agree as a matter of international justice neither to a global difference princi-
ple to govern the distribution of wealth and income in and through the global 
economy nor to a global principle of democracy to govern global or regional 
institutions such as the United Nations, World Trade Organization or Euro-
pean Union. With no compelling reason to fear or avoid  
noncooperation, each will find it rational to veto any principle not to their 
maximal advantage under the most favorable of possible circumstances. As a 
matter of global economic justice, all will agree to the principles of free and 
fair trade essential to any mutually advantageous system of cooperation, and 
to a duty of assistance to aid burdened societies incapable of constituting 
themselves as a people. But none will agree to more. Since the cost of  
noncooperation is acceptable, each agent can afford to reason optimistically, 
as if representing a wealthy and economically powerful people. So each will 
veto any more egalitarian principles proposed for governing international 
economic cooperation. The same reasoning will lead each to veto any democ-
ratic principles for governing international governing institutions. Thus, the 




Matters are quite different with the use of the original 
position argument to identify principles of domestic justice. 
There the parties represented are not assumed to be self– 
sufficient. Their existence and status as moral agents depends 
on and arises through cooperation; noncooperation is not an 
option.23 Thus, the terms of the agreement will not reflect 
any veto exercised by agents unwilling to agree to principles 
not maximally advantageous to the parties they represent 
under the best of possible circumstances. The cost of exercis-
ing such a veto, noncooperation, is simply too high to make it 
rational to do so.24 
Admittedly, Rawls does not develop this line of argument 
in LP. But it is implicit there and fully consistent with Rawls’s 
stated views. Once made explicit, it answers adequately the 
question posed by critics, to–wit: Why would agents repre-
senting only liberal democratic peoples settle for anything 
less than liberal democratic principles of international jus-
tice? The answer: They don’t need to cooperate to achieve 
their most fundamental interests and thus, even from behind 
                                                                                                
principles of international justice reflect the fair bargaining over terms of in-
ternational cooperation by agents who have no compelling reason not to rea-
son as if they represent wealthy and powerful peoples prepared to settle for 
noncooperation rather than for cooperation on terms not maximally favor-
able to them and their interests. 
23 And this explains why Rawls makes use of a list of primary social goods to be 
distributed by principles of domestic justice. The parties to any agreement 
over principles of domestic justice must cooperate with one another if they 
are to enjoy their moral status as persons. Accordingly, they all necessarily 
seek from their cooperation certain common generic goods, namely those es-
sential to their moral status as persons. Rawls’s famous two principles consti-
tute, in his view, the most reasonable distribution of those common generic 
goods. But Rawls allows that other principles may also constitute reasonable, 
even if less reasonable, distributions. Utilitarian principles, of course, do not 
constitute an even minimally reasonable distribution, at least insofar as they 
fail to protect certain basic liberties essential to the moral status of persons. 
Here it is noteworthy that in LP Rawls does not include among the decent 
peoples to be admitted to a just society of peoples any society committed to 
and governing itself by Utilitarian principles. 
24 Note that all that is claimed here is that in the domestic context a maximax 
strategy is irrational or simply inconceivable. It doesn’t follow that a minimax 
strategy is the most rational strategy, although given other considerations it 
may be. 
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an appropriate veil of ignorance, they have no reason not to 
bargain under the assumption that the parties they represent 
have been favored by nature, history and chance, and to de-
mand principles consistent with the maximal advantage of 
the parties they represent so imagined. They thus settle on 
principles requiring only that they maintain their moral 
status as peoples and that cooperation be always genuinely 
voluntary, and thus mutually advantageous. Settling on such 
principles has the further advantage that it permits each  
liberal democratic people to take pride in its own domestic 
system of liberal democratic civil and political rights as a 
matter of its own self–determination. 
Peoples, Persons and History. 
The foregoing argument assumes, with Rawls, that prin-
ciples of international justice are to be identified and justified 
through reference to the fundamental interests of peoples. It 
is, after all, the interests of peoples that are represented in 
both of Rawls’s uses of the original position argument in LP. 
But suppose we think principles of international justice must 
be identified and justified through reference to the funda-
mental interests of individual human persons. Wouldn’t we 
then be driven by any plausible original position argument to 
principles of international justice, including a doctrine of 
human rights, more robustly liberal and democratic? This is 
the question many of Rawls’s critics rhetorically ask.25 
Initially, we need to note that Rawls does take seriously 
and at a foundational level the interests of human beings 
when it comes to the identification and justification of princi-
ples of international justice. He does so through his idea(l) of 
well–ordered peoples. It is simply wrong, therefore, to claim 
that Rawls gives complete priority within international justice 
to the interests of peoples over the interests of individual hu-
man beings or persons. On Rawls’s view, issues of interna-
tional justice arise only if peoples exist. And peoples exist only 
if they provide for all their individual human members the 
                                                 
25 Beitz and Tan in particular insist on this line of objection. 




social and material conditions minimally necessary to per-
sonhood. So, the objection must be that in his theory of inter-
national justice and his doctrine of human rights Rawls gives 
too much weight to the interests of peoples and too little 
weight to at least some of the interests of individual human 
beings or persons.26 
The trouble with this objection is that the fundamental 
interests of human persons above and beyond those specified 
by Rawls’s doctrine of human rights – rights grounded in the 
interests of human beings and thereby incorporated into the 
interests of human persons – are a function of the history and 
structure of the peoples to which they belong and through 
which they are constituted as persons with fundamental in-
terests. This can be seen more clearly by attending to two ex-
amples of the ways in which the fundamental interests of 
persons within familiar contemporary pluralist liberal de-
mocracies depend on historical and structural facts about the 
peoples to which they belong that are not now universally 
shared by all peoples and cannot reasonably be assumed to be 
necessarily shared in time by all peoples. 
At the heart of liberalism in the domestic context lies a 
fact and an ideal, on Rawls’s view. The fact is that of  
reasonable pluralism with respect to comprehensive doc-
trines. The ideal is that of reciprocity. Together these ground 
political liberalism, with its democratic component, as 
Rawls’s favored conception of domestic justice. 
Critics of LP and the conception of human rights Rawls 
offers there argue that the fact of reasonable pluralism and 
the ideal of reciprocity dictate some form of liberal demo- 
                                                 
26 Another aspect of the objection which needs clarification concerns the claim 
that Rawls’s failure to take seriously enough the interests of individual human 
persons is responsible for his failure to endorse principles of democracy as 
binding on international institutions. This can not be right, since from the 
point of view of the interests of individual human persons there is no reason 
to give very differently sized peoples the same democratic vote within an in-
ternational institution. Indeed, the idea of democratic principles as applying 
to international institutions makes sense only if one takes peoples as artificial 
corporate persons to be the primary moral actors rather than individual hu-
man persons. 
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cracy as the only reasonable conception of domestic justice 
for any and every people. Indeed, they note, Rawls sometimes 
seems himself committed to this position. He never claims 
that the common good conceptions of justice affirmed by de-
cent but illiberal and undemocratic peoples are as reasonable 
as any liberal democratic conception. And he maintains that 
it is perfectly appropriate for those living in liberal democra-
cies to hope and even to work as individuals for the internal 
liberalization and democratization of all peoples.27 Individu-
                                                 
27 Rawls insists that it would be a misreading of his conception of international 
justice or his doctrine of human rights to conclude that he no longer thinks 
liberal democratic institutions and intuitions more reasonable and hence 
more just than any alternative. It is true that on his view illiberal and un-
democratic peoples may fully honor human rights and thus, if they are also 
non–aggressive toward other peoples (and keep their treaties, etc.), fully 
comply with the demands of international justice. But it does not follow that 
their domestic institutions are as reasonable as those of liberal democratic 
peoples. Still, he insists, so long as a people honors basic human rights (and 
constitutes and governs itself as a non–aggressive people) the reasonableness 
of its domestic institutions is not an issue of international justice. That does not 
mean, however, that it is not an issue of international politics to be pursued 
by liberal democratic peoples or by various NGO’s and civic associations 
within a global civil society. 
 Human rights specify a necessary condition to be met by the domestic politi-
cal and legal institutions of any people in good standing in a just international 
order. They thus set a limit on the pluralism among and toleration between 
peoples. Their realization by a people, Rawls argues, is sufficient to block jus-
tified and forceful intervention by other peoples into its domestic affairs, 
whether by military or non–military (diplomatic or economic sanctions) 
means.  
 Rawls is careful here not to say that the realization by a people of basic hu-
man rights is sufficient to block as unjustified any and all exercise of diplo-
matic or economic pressure by other peoples. But few are the steps he thinks 
a liberal democracy may justifiably take to encourage an illiberal and un-
democratic people to realize a conception of human rights more robust than 
that demanded (on his view) by international justice. For example, he explic-
itly claims that a liberal democracy ought not, as a matter of its foreign policy, 
offer subsidies or other incentives to illiberal and undemocratic peoples al-
ready in full compliance with the human rights he identifies. He gives two 
reasons for this. First, liberal democracies ought first to use their financial re-
sources to meet their duty of assistance to burdened societies unable to meet 
these basic human rights or otherwise to constitute themselves as a genuine 
people, even if illiberal and undemocratic. Second, liberal democratic peoples 
must respect the good of self–determination for all peoples, and this good 
outweighs whatever moral gains might be secured by a liberalization or de-
mocratization purchased through subsidies or other incentives. 




als living in liberal democracies, and the civic associations 
(including NGO’s) they form, may and presumably ought to 
push more aggressively for the domestic liberalization and 
democratization of illiberal and undemocratic peoples. They 
may even offer financial incentives and subsidies. It is only 
liberal democratic peoples acting as a people through their 
foreign policy that must refrain from aggressively pushing 
liberalization or democratization. As between peoples, politi-
cal relations must reflect mutual respect and a commitment 
to change through dialogue and persuasion, a politics within 
the limits of reason alone. Within a global civil society, how-
ever, more aggressive political initiatives are possible. Of 
course, illiberal and undemocratic states may, consistent with 
the human rights demands of international justice, limit the 
activities of various foreign civic associations within their 
borders. And liberal democratic states ought not seek to ac-
complish indirectly through NGO’s and other associations 
what they ought not seek to accomplish directly, e.g., by pres-
suring multinational corporations to adopt certain global in-
vestment patterns intended to function as financial incentives 
for illiberal and undemocratic but otherwise decent peoples 
to liberalize and democratize. So, the critics press, Rawls 
ought simply to concede that illiberal and undemocratic peo-
ples are all unreasonable and thus not potentially full mem-
bers in good standing in a just international society of peo-
ples. 
What these (or most of these) critics miss, however, is 
that the reasonableness of a people’s internal domestic order 
is not a matter which can be fully assessed from some fully 
                                                                                                
 On Rawls’s view, then, there are only two foreign policy tools available to 
liberal democracies eager to encourage the liberalization and democratiza-
tion of illiberal and undemocratic peoples already in compliance with basic 
human rights as Rawls conceives them. The first is diplomatic dialogue and 
persuasion (which may take the form of an immanent critique appealing to 
local values or of an appeal to more or less foreign liberal democratic  
values). The second is the hopefully inevitably liberalizing and  
democratizing effects of numerous forms of voluntary contact and exchange. 
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trans–historical, cross–cultural point of view.28 The point of 
view from which the reasonableness of a people’s internal 
domestic order is to be fully assessed is always informed by 
substantive ideals or standards of the reasonable itself. And 
these, Rawls insists, are given neither by the merely formal or 
procedural requirements of practical reasoning nor by such 
minimalist or thin claims as “each human being has a fun-
damental interest in the social conditions minimally  
necessary to realizing and maintaining the moral status of 
personhood.” They are given instead by a people’s shared 
understanding of the fundamental interests shared by human 
persons (rather than the fundamental interest in personhood 
shared by human beings). One or another form of liberal 
democracy is the most reasonable conception of domestic 
justice, therefore, only where persons widely share a specific 
common understanding of their fundamental interests as 
persons, or as persons qua citizens. This conception is likely 
to be widely shared only under certain general historical and 
cultural conditions. Two in particular merit mentioning, and 
these constitute the two examples I mentioned earlier. 
The first concerns the fact of reasonable pluralism as a fact 
of reasonable disagreement over comprehensive moral, reli-
gious and philosophical doctrines. While Rawls sometimes 
treats this as a trans–historical permanent fact of the human 
condition, such a reading is a bit of philosophical speculation 
that may itself be reasonably rejected.29 Of course, the fact of 
reasonable pluralism is a fact for the foreseeable future in many 
societies, including those of Europe and North America with 
their shared history of religious fragmentation, Enlightenment, 
modernity and the like. There it cannot reasonably be rejected 
                                                 
28 It must be emphasized that Rawls does think that the reasonableness of a 
peoples internal domestic political order may be partially assessed from a suf-
ficiently trans–cultural, trans–historical objective point of view. That point of 
view is the view of biological human beings possessed of the potential to 
achieve moral personhood. And from that point of view, any society that fails 
to honor Rawls’s doctrine of human rights is without a reasonable domestic 
political order. 
29 I have argued for this point elsewhere. 




(as a fact of history extended into the foreseeable future). But it 
is not obviously a fact for all peoples. Those without the relevant 
sort of history and thus still largely unified through a shared 
commitment to one or another comprehensive doctrine from 
which they derive their common good conception of justice 
may not unreasonably maintain that while they can deny nei-
ther the reality of simple disagreement nor the possibility of rea-
sonable disagreement tout court (and must thus permit a certain 
limited measure of dissent, freedom of religious practice, etc.), 
they need not affirm what history has not in fact revealed to 
them, namely the fact of reasonable disagreement as it extends 
to matters of comprehensive moral, religious or philosophical 
doctrine. It is only when assessed against the background of cer-
tain features common to the history of liberal democratic peo-
ples that the affirmation by decent peoples of a common good 
conception of justice (hostile to certain liberal democratic rights) 
will prove unreasonable. This would, perhaps, be beside the 
point if it were unreasonable to think that decent peoples would 
not inevitably in time share the same history as liberal democ-
ratic peoples. But there is no non–question begging way to es-
tablish this in a dialogue between liberal and decent peoples. 
History is simply open on this point.30 
The second way in which the reasonableness of liberal de-
mocratic conceptions of justice depends on historical and cul-
tural context concerns the liberal democratic idea(l) of the free 
and equal person (whether qua person or qua citizen). This 
idea(l) presupposes a certain cultural and institutional back-
ground. Absent some form of the family within which all chil-
dren are extended and able to internalize a like kind and degree 
of unconditional love sufficient to underwrite a certain common 
                                                 
30 That is, there is no non–question begging way to establish in a global dialogue 
between peoples the fact of reasonable pluralism (extended to comprehensive 
doctrines) as a permanent fact of the human condition that every people 
must ultimately accept. Decent peoples will simply assert that if  
afforded an appropriate degree of independence and (limited) sovereignty, 
their unity in and through a shared commitment to a particular comprehen-
sive doctrine will endure. This may be a false prediction, but it is one that rea-
sonable peoples may make. 
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sense of self–worth, and absent some form of civil society within 
which persons who regard themselves as independent and 
similar sources of valid claims on others seek as individuals to 
advance their interests through mutual and voluntary  
bargaining and the like, the idea(l) of the free and equal citizen 
as the primary element within those domestic relations constitu-
tive of the state simply has no purchase on or contact with social 
life as lived and experienced. 
To be sure, all peoples, including illiberal and undemocratic 
but still decent peoples, must provide for all their human mem-
bers the material and social conditions minimally necessary to 
personhood. And this will limit, as does Rawls’s doctrine of hu-
man rights, the forms that families may permissibly take and the 
ways in which the activities of persons within civil society may 
be regulated.31 But within this limit a people may constitute it-
self as a people, the members of which enjoy the material and 
social conditions minimally necessary to personhood, without 
incorporating the family and civil society in their forms familiar 
to liberal democratic peoples. It must be emphasized here that 
there may still be good grounds for criticizing the inegalitarian, 
nonindividualistic, illiberal and undemocratic forms of the fam-
ily or civil society found within decent peoples. The point is sim-
ply that the basis of such criticism cannot be that they necessar-
ily fall short of the social conditions minimally necessary to per-
sonhood. Rather, the basis of such criticism must be that such 
institutional arrangements fall short of the social conditions 
necessary and sufficient to a particular and more attractive con-
ception of personhood, one historically achieved and widely 
affirmed by and within liberal democratic peoples. 
In a significant sense, then, the rights essential to liberal 
democratic conceptions of domestic justice are an effect and not 
the cause of the underlying social processes which  
construct the sort of persons presupposed by such conceptions 
                                                 
31 The family and a public sphere in some form or other are each necessary 
institutional elements of all peoples. They are essential to the moral develop-
ment of human beings into human persons. They need not take the same 
form, however, in all peoples. And thus the fundamental interests of human 
persons may vary from people to people. 




of justice. It is because the family and civil society developed in a 
particular way or ways in Europe and elsewhere that human 
beings were made there into the sort of persons fitted for and 
inclined to demand the full panoply of liberal and democratic 
rights. This constitutes a second sense, then, in which the rea-
sonableness of liberal democracy is a function, at least in part, of 
certain cultural and institutional background conditions, which 
may or may not obtain within all peoples.32 
In many ways, Rawls’s own analysis points in the direction 
suggested by Brown. Individual persons acquire their moral 
capacities and their fundamental interests by virtue of their be-
longing to a particular form of social life, to a people with a his-
tory and a sense of itself. There are, of course, limits as to what 
counts as a people, and these limits are normative, since peoples 
are persons capable of making valid claims as a matter of jus-
tice. But assuming that the ideas of well–orderedness and of a 
self–sufficient cooperative scheme mark those limits, we cannot 
then say what rights all individual persons possess as a matter of 
international justice, beyond those derived from the idea(l) of a 
well–ordered, self–sufficient people itself, prior to identifying 
those principles of international justice no people could rea-
sonably reject. It is for this reason, then, and not out of a pru-
dential concern for global stability, that Rawls’s conception of 
human rights takes the shape it does. Absent these background 
conditions, it is not unreasonable for a people to reject liberal 
democratic principles of domestic justice. Again, this would 
perhaps be irrelevant if there were a non–question  
                                                 
32 Rawls flirts with this point in his discussion of one ideal type of decent people, 
the decent consultation hierarchy. There he notes that in such a society indi-
vidual persons are conceived as belonging first to groups, and that the recon-
ciliation of their interests through the state is accordingly mediated through 
their group membership. In such a society, presumably, the liberal democ-
ratic conception of the citizen would be able to gain no foothold. See Rawls, 
The Laws of..., cit., pp. 71–73. 
 The connection between the reasonableness of liberal democracy and the 
cultural and institutional forces necessary to create the sort of individual per-
sons to whom liberal democracy appeals is discussed by Chris Brown in 
“Universal Human Rights: A Critique,” in Dunne, T., and Wheeler, N., Hu-
man Rights in Global Politics, Cambridge University Press, 1999.  
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begging way for liberal democratic peoples to show that these 
background conditions were themselves either historically  
inevitable or required by justice. But so much appears not to be 
the case. 
Thus, even if one supposes that the primary concern of in-
ternational justice is the resolution of conflicting claims  
between human persons, wherever they may be, and that  
accordingly the demands of international justice are to be de-
termined by reference to an original position argument within 
which agents represent individual human persons and seek 
principles for the regulation of their global cooperation, the path 
to a more robustly liberal and democratic doctrine of human 
rights remains blocked. Since neither history nor reason show 
decisively that a people must be liberal and democratic in order 
to afford its members the material and social conditions mini-
mally necessary to personhood, agents in such an original posi-
tion must consider the interests of persons as constituted by or 
through membership in both decent and liberal democratic 
peoples. They will therefore have reason to reject principles of 
international justice that effectively demand, rather than merely 
permit, liberal democratic domestic institutions. 
Human beings universally share a fundamental interest in 
achieving and maintaining personhood and thus in the social 
conditions minimally necessary thereto. But their fundamental 
interests as persons are historically, socially and contingently 
given, and not necessarily shared. Thus, we can arrive at a more 
liberal democratic doctrine of human rights having departed 
from an original position argument within which agents repre-
sent individual human beings or persons only if we smuggle 
into the argument controversial claims about the interests or 
perfection of all human beings or persons. 
Conclusion 
In the end, I think Rawls’s doctrine of human rights is less 
vulnerable to objection than many of his critics have claimed. 
The doctrine protects the fundamental interest all human  
beings share in the social conditions minimally necessary to 




moral personhood, while at the same time respecting the moral 
status of peoples as artificial corporate moral agents. It permits 
the liberalization and democratization of international law, but 
demands, consistent with the moral imperatives of reciprocity, 
that it be accomplished through voluntary treaty–making  
between peoples committed to mutual respect. And it remains 
firmly grounded in, indeed never runs beyond, a conception of 
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